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Hierarchy is Detrimental for Human 
Cooperation
Katherine A. Cronin1,2, Daniel J. Acheson3, Penélope Hernández4 & Angel Sánchez5,6
Studies of animal behavior consistently demonstrate that the social environment impacts cooperation, 
yet the efect of social dynamics has been largely excluded from studies of human cooperation. 
Here, we introduce a novel approach inspired by nonhuman primate research to address how social 
hierarchies impact human cooperation. Participants competed to earn hierarchy positions and then 
could cooperate with another individual in the hierarchy by investing in a common efort. Cooperation 
was achieved if the combined investments exceeded a threshold, and the higher ranked individual 
distributed the spoils unless control was contested by the partner. Compared to a condition lacking 
hierarchy, cooperation declined in the presence of a hierarchy due to a decrease in investment by lower 
ranked individuals. Furthermore, hierarchy was detrimental to cooperation regardless of whether it 
was earned or arbitrary. These indings mirror results from nonhuman primates and demonstrate that 
hierarchies are detrimental to cooperation. However, these results deviate from nonhuman primate 
indings by demonstrating that human behavior is responsive to changing hierarchical structures and 
suggests partnership dynamics that may improve cooperation. This work introduces a controled way to 
investigate the social inluences on human behavior, and demonstrates the evolutionary continuity of 
human behavior with other primate species.
Determining the conditions that facilitate cooperation in humans has been a chalenge embraced by many disci-
plines; evolutionary biologists, psychologists, and social scientists have been atempting to tackle this question for 
decades1–3. Understanding when cooperation lourishes is of both theoretical and practical interest as our species 
faces environmental and societal chalenges that may only be solved by working together4,5. Cooperation has been 
deined in many ways6; here we are referring to cases in which two or more individuals work together to achieve a 
common goal7. While this form of cooperation is not altruistic (nobody necessarily incurs a cost for cooperating), 
choosing with whom to cooperate and under what conditions to invest limited resources into cooperation poses 
a signiicant chalenge for our species and others8–10.
he efect of the social environment on cooperation has received atention in studies of nonhuman animal 
behavior but has been largely overlooked in human research. Research with animals in the wild and under con-
troled conditions in captivity has consistently shown that social dynamics, and speciicaly the nature of the 
dominance hierarchy, has a large impact on cooperative outcomes9,11–19. Although variable in form, every animal 
society has some form of dominance hierarchy20,21. Hierarchy is deined as priority of access to resources and 
probability of winning competitive encounters22, and relects underlying assymetries in power. A hierarchy can 
be characterized in terms of linearity and steepness22, with the former providing information about the degree of 
transitivity between individuals and the later indicating the extent to which individuals difer from each other 
in winning encounters or accessing resources. Among nonhuman primates, it has been demonsrated repeatedly 
that the characteristics of dominance hierarchies impact cooperative outcomes, with steep and linear hierarchies 
being associated with decreased cooperation. For example, experiments have shown that cooperation is impeded 
among chimpanzees living in steep and linear hierarchies16,23, whereas it emerges more easily among species with 
more relaxed hierarchies such as cotontop tamarins15–17.
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A great deal of research has focused on human cooperative behavior24, but these experiments have primarily 
been conducted with anonymous participants25,26, leaving the inluence of social relationships on cooperation 
largely overlooked27. Although the inluence of hierarchy on cooperation has rarely been examined, researchers 
have considered hierarchy’s inluence on economic issues such as market entry28, bargaining29,30, and learning31. 
Other work has investigated how disproportionate power in sanctioning inluences cooperation32, and both empir-
ical33,34 and modeling35,36 investigations have been directed at how group status impacts cooperation and competi-
tion with other groups. In the current study, we hypothesize that social relationships, and speciicaly hierarchical 
relationships relecting power assymetries between individuals, wil have a negative impact on human cooperation 
as it does in our nonhuman primate relatives. In order to test the efect of social hierarchy on cooperation, we 
present participants with a task inspired by nonhuman primate research in which two individuals of known social 
rank are presented with the opportunity to invest in a cooperative task, and, if a threshold of investment is met and 
cooperation is achieved, the higher ranking of the two investors controls the distribution of the resource16,37,38. 
To investigate how human cooperation is impacted by the presence of a social hierarchy, we compare cooperative 
success in the presence of a hierarchy (with both earned and arbitrarily assigned ranks) to success in a condition 
when hierarchy is absent.
Experimental design
In order to probe the efects of hierarchy on human cooperation, we adapted a classic mutualistic cooperation 
task employed in nonhuman primate studies15,16,39,40 for use with human participants. In this task, two individ-
uals have the opportunity to work together to obtain some beneit that is not pre-divided for the players. In the 
present study, the only social feature we manipulated was hierarchy, which alowed us to isolate this efect while 
preventing confounding efects arising from other social relations. To generate the hierarchies, we asked groups 
of ten anonymous participants to carry out multiple unrelated tasks on a computer (see Methods Summary below 
and Supplemental Information for a ful description), and ranked them according to their overal performance. 
Subsequently, participants were arranged in pairs and participants were informed of their own rank and the rank 
of the person with whom they were paired. In the cooperation phase, both players in the pair were assigned 20 units 
and given the option to contribute simultaneously any number of these units to a common pot, unaware of the 
partner’s contribution. ECUs not contributed to the common pot were not lost to the player but could be obtained 
in the inal payout. If this pot reached or exceeded 20 units, then the pot doubled to 40 units for the spliting phase, 
otherwise they obtained nothing (i.e., their contributions to the pot were lost). Players were informed only whether 
the threshold was reached or not, and did not know a posteriori the amount contributed by their partner.
he spliting phase was implemented with an ultimatum game. he higher-ranked individual proposed how to 
split the 40-unit pot, and if the proposal was accepted by the lower-ranked person, each would receive the stipulated 
amount. If the lower-ranked person rejected the higher-ranked person’s proposal, s/he could atempt to compete 
and a lotery would assign the 40 units to one of the two members of the pair with probability proportional to 
their rank (which was known to the participants). Given that hierarchy is deined as priority of access to resources 
and the probability of winning competitive encounters22, these methods were designed to maintain the impact of 
hierarchy throughout the experiment.
Players played nine rounds, interacting with every other player in the group so al possible rank diferences could 
be explored. Each player experienced one of three diferent treatments: the “earned hierarchy condition” (described 
above), a “random hierarchy condition” in which the ranking was assigned randomly without performing any task, 
or a control condition with no hierarchy. In the control condition, when the proponent’s ofer was rejected, the 
whole pot was assigned to one of the players with equal probability.
Results
In what folows, we analyze the experimental results using mixed-efects models, the appropriate technique when 
individuals are embedded within a group and are paired with each other across several interactions (and hence are 
not independent). his approach, combined with random selection of the individuals representing each dyad (when 
dyads were the proper level of analysis) and a bootstrap resampling technique, alows us to establish signiicance 
with a large degree of accuracy (see Supplemental Information).
First, we look at if (and how) the existence of a hierarchy afected success in the cooperation phase. Figure 1A 
shows that success (reaching or exceeding 20 units colectively) in the control condition was signiicantly more 
frequent than that of the hierarchicaly organized groups (95% CI for the coeicient, [0.14, 0.45]), indicating 
that participants were more prone to cooperation in the treatment lacking hierarchy. Interestingly, there was no 
diference between the random and earned hierarchy conditions, indicating that whether rank arose from per-
sonal performance or was randomly assigned did not afect cooperation success. herefore, we pooled the two 
hierarchical treatments in subsequent analyses. In the control condition the average contribution to the pot was 
signiicantly greater than in the hierarchical treatments (95% CI for the coeicient, [0.23, 0.58]), cf. Fig. 1B) leading 
to more successful cooperation events in the absence of a hierarchy. We also found an interaction between the 
presence or absence of hierarchy and round of play, which emerged from the fact that the diference in cooperative 
success between the hierarchy and no hierarchy conditions increased as the experiment proceeded (95% CI for the 
coeicient, [0.007, 0.116], cf. Fig. 1C). Finaly, we observed that there was a positive correlation between rank and 
total earnings in the experiment (see Supplemental Information), i.e., higher ranked participants received larger 
payments than lower ranked ones. herefore, in this experiment we did in fact see that higher ranked individuals 
obtained more resources.
Why does cooperation sufer in the presence of a hierarchy? While the contributions from both partners are 
similar in the condition with no hierarchy, they difer clearly in the two hierarchical treatments (Fig. 2A). he 
main reason for the decrease in successful cooperation events can be traced to diminishing contributions by 
lower ranked individuals (Fig. 2B). Indeed, in this respect, our analysis shows that there is a signiicant diference 
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in contributions between higher and lower ranked individuals (95% CI for the coeicient, [− 1.65,− 0.79]) and a 
signiicant interaction of rank and round (95% CI for the coeicient, [− 0.30, − 0.10]). Figure 2B shows that higher 
ranked participants increase their contributions as the experiment procedes while lower ranked participants 
decrease their contributions. hus, it is the lack of contribution from the lower ranked players that leads to more 
cooperation failures. Figure 3 shows that, in the hierarchy conditions, lower ranking individuals contribute litle 
in unsuccessful atempts (when the 20 unit minimum is not reached) compared to higher ranking individuals, and 
when cooperation is achieved, lower ranking individuals’ contributions barely surpass ten units. In view of this 
evidence, it appears that both individuals realized the consequences of their rankings on their potential earnings. 
Accordingly, lower ranked participants responded by reducing their investment, whereas higher ranked partici-
pants anticipated the reluctance of their partner and invested more in an atempt to rescue cooperation, but oten 
not enough to be successful. In fact, when we examined whether the magnitude of the rank diference predicted 
cooperation investments, we found that the amount contributed by lower ranked participants increases (and the 
a
b
c
Figure 1. Success and contributions decrease in hierarchicaly organized groups, irrespective of the origin 
of the ranking. (A) he mean number of succesful instances of cooperation in the control condition in which 
there was no hierarchy was signiicantly higher than both hierarchical conditions. he maximum number 
of cooperative successes was 9. (B) he mean player contribution in the cooperative task with and without 
hierarchy. (C) Mean cooperation success as a function of round and hierarchy condition shows that there is 
a smal but signiicant interaction among these variables, which might arise from the fact that the diferences 
between the two treatments appear to increase as the experiment progresses. Colors correspond to the three 
types of hierarchical treatment as indicated in the plot.
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amount contributed by higher ranked participants decreases) as the rank diference became smaler, i.e., as the 
chances of receiving the whole pot by chance increased (95% CI for the coeicient, [− 0.47, − 0.25]) (cf. Fig. 2C).
Let us now move on to the behavior of players in the ultimatum game with an (hierarchy-based) outside 
option41, or the “spliting phase”. In the absence of hierarchy, we observed that proponents ofered on average 25% 
less than what receivers were wiling to accept. When hierarchy was introduced, this diference was again observed, 
but proponents ofered lower amounts for higher rank diferences and receivers stated a lower minimum amount 
they would accept (Fig. 4). On the other hand, our analysis shows that both ofers and expectations are independent 
of the investments made in the cooperation phase. his inding is further supported by the results of two addi-
tional treatments in which the cooperation phase was omited and players proceeded directly from the hierarchy 
formation stage, be it earned or random, to the spliting phase. We did not observe any signiicant diferences in 
the amounts ofered and expected between these treatments and those in which there was a cooperation stage 
(see Supplementary Information). Such a result may be explained by a similar feeling of entitlement in the spliting 
phase regardless of whether this phase folowed successful cooperation.
a
b
c
Figure 2. Contributions decrease in the hierarchy condition for lower ranking partners, and are 
predicted by the rank diference. (A) he contributions by the higher and lower ranked partners in the three 
experimental conditions, (B) the contributions by the higher and lower ranked partners in the hierarchy and 
non-hierarchy treatments across rounds, (C) the contribution as a function of the rank diference between the 
two partners of the dyad. Negative numbers correspond to higher ranking positions, e.g., − 8indicates the focal 
player (whose contribution we are evaluating), was ranked 1 and her partner was ranked 9).
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It is interesting to observe that, in the absence of hierarchy, i.e., when the chance to receive the pot is 0.5, 
respondents play very closely to the Nash equilibrium of the game, accepting only 20 units or more of the pot. 
his is much larger than minimum acceptable ofers typicaly found in the standard ultimatum game26. his may 
have arisen because of the cooperation phase as discussed above. Alternatively, it seems more likely that this arises 
because respondents have a large chance to keep the whole pot when they refuse the ofer in this experiment, 
contrary to the typical ultimatum game in which they would receive nothing. When hierarchy is present, Nash 
equilibrium predicts that the higher ranked individual should ofer 4k (see “Subgame perfect equilibrium calcula-
tion” in the Supplementary Information), k being a measure of rank diference (k = 1 corresponds to a diference 
in rank of 8 or 9; k = 2, to 6 or 7; k = 3, to 4 or 5; k = 4, to 2 or 3, and k = 5, to a diference of 1), and the lower 
ranked individual should accept it. We do not presume that the participants make these calculations, rather, they 
adjust their behavior based on their understanding of the experiment and their experiences in previous rounds. 
In the present experiment, the behavior of the two partners is only qualitatively similar to the Nash equilibrium. 
Remarkably, higher ranked individuals make ofers closer to the prediction, while lower ranked individuals expect 
to receive a signiicantly larger amount of the pot.
Another interesting observation is that for greater rank diferences (lower k), the higher ranked individu-
als are prone to share an amount larger than the Nash prediction. Additionaly, for al rank diferences, receiv-
ers state a minimum amount that they would accept that is greater than theory and dictators’ action prescribe 
(cf. Fig. 4). his might arise from the fact that proponents perceive the spliting phase closer to a standard ultima-
tum game than it actualy is. When their partner is much lower in rank, even if she rejects the ofer, the proponent 
has a large probability to keep the whole pot (while in the ultimatum game the proponent would receive nothing). 
Accordingly, they ofer a larger amount than the Nash equilibrium would predict, probably because they fear losing 
their share, to which they feel entitled. his agrees with the slopes of the rank dependence of ofers and acceptance 
levels being lower than the Nash prediction; however, they are not completely horizontal as in the control con-
dition because participants may stil partialy take into account the lack of refusal power of the respondent. Such 
consideration would efectively make the hierarchy less important, as the individuals in the lowest positions would 
be treated as if they were ranked higher. It is important to note, however, that the hierarchy itself is not changed, 
as it is ixed from the beginning of the experiment, and individuals with lower ranking were stil ofered less than 
intermediate-ranked ones.
a
b
Figure 3. Contributions difer markedly in the cases when cooperation is or is not achieved. (A) Mean 
player contribution in the cooperative task when cooperation fails (red) and when it succeeds (blue) for the 
higher ranked player in the three experimental conditions. (B) he same for the lower ranked player. Note that 
when there is no hierarchy the behavior of both types of player is the same.
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Discussion
We have shown that achieving cooperation among humans is more diicult when there is an underlying hierarchical 
structure producing diferent ranks between people and therefore unequal payofs for the participants. his result is 
driven by insuicient contributions from lower ranked individuals who cannot be conident that they wil beneit 
from cooperating. Remarkably, human behavior is consistent with a trend that permeates the rest of the primate 
order; primates in steeply hierarchical societies have diiculty cooperating for beneits that must be divided16,21,42, 
whereas primates organized in weakly hierarchical (egalitarian) societies are more successful16,37. Whether this 
patern holds outside of the primate order requires additional research given that dyadic cooperative chalenges 
have only rarely been presented to other taxa (but see refs 43–47 for related studies on dogs, hyenas, rooks, parrots 
and elephants). Hierarchies reliably predict resource distribution in nonhuman primates, therefore atempts to 
complete a joint task are presumably hampered by the lower ranked individual’s awareness that the higher ranked 
individual wil keep the whole pot for itself. For example, among one of our closest living relatives, chimpanzees 
(Pan troglodytes), lower ranked individuals avoided engaging with higher ranked individuals in a task producing 
rewards that must be divided48 whereas egalitarian cotontop tamarins (Saguinus oedipus) readily perform a joint 
task for undivided rewards37. he same impact of hierarchy appears to be true in our own species, suggesting 
continuity in the evolution of mutualistic cooperation among humans and other primates.
a
c
e
b
d
Figure 4. Ofers and thresholds in the spliting phase behave qualitatively as predicted by Nash 
equilibrium. Mean ofer and threshold in the ultimatum game with (hierarchy-based) outside option41 vs k, the 
groups of rank diferences organized as indicated in the text, with rank diference being smaler with increasing k. 
Plots (A) through (E) correspond to our ive treatments: (A) no hierarchy, ful experiment (cooperation plus 
spliting); (B) earned hierarchy, no cooperation task; (C) random hierarchy, no cooperation task; (D) earned 
hierarchy, ful experiment, and (E) random hierarchy, ful experiment. In al plots, red circles correspond to the 
proposer’s ofer, blue triangles correspond to the responder’s minimum acceptable ofer, and the green solid line 
is the theoretical prediction of the Nash equilibrium for both the minimum acceptable ofer and the proposer’s 
ofer.
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his study was designed to recreate key aspects of cooperation studies conducted with nonhuman primates 
to enable comparisons across species. However, one notable diference between the present study and studies 
conducted with nonhuman species is the inclusion of verbal instructions for participants and the opportunity for 
participants to ask clarifying questions. As comparative approaches to studying the evolution of economic behavior 
continue to develop, it would be beneicial to develop methods that do not require explicit instruction to human 
participants and rely more heavily on participants’ learning the boundaries of the games through experience49.
As our experiment was designed with a smal number of rounds to avoid the reputation efects that may result 
from playing twice with the same partner, we are prevented from examining whether learning or previous experi-
ence afects individual behavioral sequences. As mentioned above, the data suggest that participants’ cooperation 
changes over rounds, but the corresponding efect is smal. Given a longer sequence of repeated interactions, it 
might be possible that members of a hierarchicaly organized group would partialy overcome mistrust of higher 
ranked individuals in those that establish generous reputations50 and these individuals might be able to elicit more 
contributions from their lower ranked partners. Interestingly, this could be the reason why in early societies indi-
viduals achieved a degree of preeminence by organizing parties or celebrations for the rest of the tribe or group51. 
However, it is clear that such a mechanism is not an easy one to implement and it does not arise spontaneously; in 
fact, in many early societies the ‘generosity path’ to becoming inluential is oten highly regulated, consisting of a 
set of increasingly complex and expensive parties one has to throw to advance in rank51. In any event, the outcome 
of our experiment suggests speciic points on which group members could be encouraged to take action so coop-
eration is increased and points to the detrimental efects of even transient, arbitrary hierarchies. Moving forward, 
experiments in artiicial social contexts like ours appear to be a very powerful tool to examine strategic behavior 
in socialy relevant situations. We hope that our work wil stimulate further work along these lines.
MethodsExperimental setup. he experiment was carried out with volunteers chosen among the LINEEX subject 
pool. Al participants in the experiments reported in the manuscript signed an informed consent to participate. 
In agreement with the Spanish Law for Personal Data Protection, their anonymity was always preserved. his 
procedure was approved by the Vice Provost of Research of Universidad Carlos III de Madrid, the institution 
responsible for funding the experiment, and the experiment was subsequently carried out in accordance with the 
approved guidelines.
Experiments corresponding to diferent groups were scheduled at diferent dates, namely March, 5th and 6th 
and April, 3rd 2014. Participants played through a web interface speciicaly designed for the experiment (see 
below) accessible from the computers of the lab. At least three researchers supervised the experiment in the room 
(which had a maximum capacity of 64 players), preventing any interaction among the participants. hey were not 
alowed to talk or signal in any way. In order to further guarantee that potential interactions among players seated 
next to each other in the room did not inluence results, assignment to computer stations was random and stations 
were isolated from each other by opaque panels. Hence there was no relationship between physical proximity and 
interactions in the game.
Al participants were provided with printed instructions (see Supplementary Information). When everybody 
had read the instructions, a supervisor read them aloud and verbaly conirmed that everybody had understood 
the rules of the game. Any question was privately resolved via one on one interactions between an experimenter 
and a participant. Once al questions had been answered, the irst phase of the experiment began.
240 participants (140 male, 100 female) between ages 18 and 55 took part in the experiment. 180 of them (113 
male, 67 female) took part in treatments that required cooperation to achieve the pot; the remainder proceeded 
directly to the spliting phase. Al participants were in the same room as the rest of their group and informed that 
they were playing real people. In treatments where hierarchy was earned, participants were asked to carry out 
computer tasks in order to assign ranks within groups consisting of 10 participants. Participants were presented 
with a quiz similar to other economic experimentss29–31, but were also asked them to play Tetris and to carry out 
arithmetic operations. he total number of points accumulated in the three tasks was used to rank the participants.
Participants remained at their computer station to perform each task, but were sequentialy paired with al 
other participants in their group in a random order for the cooperative task. Prior to each round, each participant 
was provided with the rank of their partner. In the cooperative task, participants were given the opportunity to 
donate to a pot in order to surpass a 20 unit threshold. Participants were informed whether or not they met the 20 
unit threshold for successful cooperation but were unaware of the contributions of their partners. If the threshold 
was met, the pot was doubled to 40 units and the spliting phase was carried out using an ultimatum game with an 
(hierarchy-based) outside option41. If the split was refused by the lower ranking partner, s/he could choose to com-
pete and a lotery would assign the whole pot to one of the two members of the pair with probability proportional 
to their rank. At the end of the experiment, units were exchanged at a rate of 15 units = 1 euro. Total earnings for 
the games of the experiment ranged from 13.00 to 36.00 euros.
Utility theory predicts that individuals should behave in the way that maximizes their own gains (for this exper-
iment, see Supplemental Information for the subgame perfect equilibrium calculation). However, it is worth noting 
that if players were to deviate from rational choice and instead employ a strategy that minimizes inequity between 
players (e.g., ref 52), lower ranking players may gain some additional control and achieve equality at a personal loss 
by refusing to invest in phase 1 or by raising their acceptance threshold in phase 2. his is not equivalent to a role 
reversal given the deinition of hierarchy above because lower ranked players wil not gain more than their higher 
ranking partner, but it may reduce the diference in gains. Interestingly, even under this alternative interpretation, 
the conclusion does not difer in that the presence of the hierarchy destabilizes cooperative interactions.
Statistical analysis. Al statistical analyses were conducted using R versión 3.1053, with mixed-efects models 
calculated using the lme4 package54. he analysis of cooperation success was conducted using a linear mixed-efects 
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model with a logistic linking function, where success was coded as 1 and failure as 0. Round was mean-centered 
prior to analysis, whereas the efects of hierarchy were contrast coded. he irst contrast compared the efect of 
no hierarchy (+ 2) to the hierarchy conditions (random and earned coded as − 1and 1 respectively). he second 
contrast compared random (− 1) vs earned (+ 1) hierarchy. As no efect of random vs. earned was observed in this 
analysis, only the contrast between the no-hierarchy and hierachy conditions was included in subsequent analyses.
As cooperation success was a function of the actions of both individuals, dyad was treated as the grouping 
variable to estimate random intercepts and a random slope for round. Parameters were estimated using a boot-
strap procedure in which one individual of each dyad was randomly selected without replacement. 100 bootstrap 
samples were drawn for this and al subsequent analyses, and 95% conidence intervals were extracted from the 
bootstrapped estimates of the parameters. he analysis of the amount of money contributed to the cooperation task 
was conducted in a similar fashion, although in this instance, the amount contributed was treated as a continuous 
variable, and random intercepts and slopes for round were estimated for the individual.
he analysis of mean cooperation ofer as a function of round and rank was conducted in two ways. First, rank 
was treated as a binary variable, coded as + 1for higher rank and − 1lower rank. his analysis was conducted 
relative to the mean ofer in the no hierarchy condition. A random intercept and random slopes for each variable 
were estimated using the individual as the grouping variable. A second analysis treated rank diference continu-
ously. he highest and lowest ranked individuals were excluded from this analysis as no random efects could be 
estimated for these individuals (they were always the highest/lowest ranked).
he analysis of the ultimatum ofers and expected ofers compared the efects of the presence/absence of a 
cooperation round and rank diference. Here, the presence of a cooperation round was coded as + 1, and the 
absence as -1. Role was coded as + 1for the person receiving, and − 1for the person ofering. he absolute value 
of the rank diference was also included, thus a diference of + /− 1was coded as 1, + /− 2as 2, etc. his alowed 
us to assess the relative efect of rank diference on ultimatum ofers/expectations regardless of the direction of 
the diference. Mean-centered round was also included, as wel as estimates of the random intercept and random 
slopes for round and rank diference using individuals as the grouping variable.
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